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Abstract
Gantt and Thayne’s (pp. 3–21) cautions about Rogerian psychotherapy are warranted. Certainly, the
theory has been interpreted in ways that lead to the very dangers they highlight. However, there may
be more to the theory than first meets the eye, and the very dangers invoked by the theory might also
represent opportunities. Neglecting some of the truths in the theory might alienate its proponents rather
than persuade them of a better way. In this response, possible compatibilities between the theory and
the gospel are explored, along with ways in which these might provide inroads for LDS psychologists to
influence a secular discipline.

I

argued that religious psychologists might reverse this
secularizing trend and bring religious views into the
broader psychological discourse (Richardson, 2013). I
think that accomplishing this might require not only
describing incompatibilities between some secular
and religious understandings—which is important—
but also attending more carefully to compatibilities.
Gantt and Thayne’s concern about situating such
conversations primarily in secular psychological

appreciate this opportunity to respond to Gantt and
Thayne (pp. 3–21). I have a great deal of respect for
both of these authors and have deeply appreciated the
opportunities I have had to associate with them both
in person and through reading and responding to their
work. I agree that psychological theories have in some
ways weakened religious understandings through
offering materialistic explanations for spiritual
phenomena (such as unfeigned love). I have also
41
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language is warranted. Certainly, some of this
language, perhaps by design, excludes spiritual
understandings. However, religious psychologists also
need to be able to communicate with their secular
colleagues and at times might be required to justify
their practices to the broader discipline. Being clearer
about the compatibilities between religious beliefs
and a secular theory, as well as being up front about
the incompatibilities, might help avoid unnecessary
alienation of religious psychologists from others
in the discipline, and vice versa. It might also open
pathways for religious influence in an otherwise
secular discipline.
Proponents of Rogers’s theory (whether religious
or secular) might object to (a) Gantt and Thayne’s
emphasis on Rogers’s unconditional positive regard
without grounding it in the context of his other important therapeutic elements, accurate empathy (or
understanding) and genuineness (or honesty), and (b)
Gantt and Thayne’s emphasis on individualism and
relativism in Rogers’s theory over relational and nonrelativistic aspects of the theory. In what follows, I address each of these possible objections while exploring ways in which communication between religious
and secular psychologists might be facilitated without sacrificing important religious understandings.
Before continuing, let me first clarify where I
think Gantt and Thayne’s analysis is fair. I agree that
Rogers’s theory has been interpreted in ways that
emphasize the same philosophical individualism
and materialism inherent in most secular counseling
theories. Like many secular psychologists prior to and
contemporary with him, Rogers abandoned religious
belief in favor of materialistic science, thereby cutting
himself off (at least consciously) from the source
of truth. Of course, since God is in and through all
things (D&C 63:59) and “all things denote there is
a God” (Alma 30:44), no theorist can escape God
or truth altogether. So, there is still much truth in
Rogers’s theory from which we might benefit as
religious psychologists and that might provide a path
for religious psychologists to influence the secular
community. That path should no longer represent
only a one-way secularizing path, as it often has in the
past, but instead of potentially reducing our influence
by closing it off altogether, we might see if we can
open a few lanes in the other direction.

Unconditional Positive Regard

I believe that Gantt and Thayne’s concerns about
unconditional positive regard are warranted. It seems
that Rogers’s description of this therapeutic element,
and its associated radical acceptance (of self and
others), has been interpreted in precisely the ways
these authors describe. Indeed, Rogers himself appears
to have taken liberties with this element near the end
of his life in sometimes putting his own perceived
needs ahead of those of his ailing wife. To his credit,
he also recognized the pain this caused his wife and
seemed to feel that subsequent efforts to improve this
relationship were successful. After his wife’s death,
Rogers appeared to allow himself even more liberties
that might cause alarm from an LDS perspective,
including sexual experiences. However, the permission
Rogers gave himself to explore his own desires later in
life also seems to have led him to question his former
doubts about spiritual realities (Rogers, 1980).
So there is certainly room for concern when
considering Rogers’s permissiveness. However, his
claim that this openness to experience also helped
bring him (not without suffering) closer to his
family, more joy in life (as well as more sorrow),
and ultimately room to exercise a “particle of faith”
(Alma 32:27) in spiritual possibilities might also
give us encouragement to consider ways in which his
theory might open possibilities for allowing religious
psychologists to influence a secular discipline. In some
ways, Rogers’s theory might be uniquely situated for
this endeavor since it appears to have evoked in him a
humility and openness to possibilities that have been
largely ignored by other secular theorists.
It is certainly true that unconditional positive
regard alone could be problematic, even in the ways
that Rogers experienced for himself. However, I argue
that unconditional positive regard did not mean, for
Rogers, that evil does not exist or that there should
be no consequences for bad behavior. Nor did Rogers
forbid therapists from expressing their own feelings
about something a client expressed with which they
disagreed. He primarily encouraged therapists to
express their feelings as their own, and to allow clients
to do the same, without labeling these expressions as
right or wrong, good or evil. In describing what he
did mean by unconditional positive regard, Rogers
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(1961) wrote, “By acceptance I mean a warm regard
for him as a person of unconditional self-worth—of
value no matter what his condition, his behavior, or
his feelings (p. 34).
It should be fairly uncontroversial in an LDS
context that the worth of a soul does not diminish
when that person sins and that we are commanded
to love even our enemies so that we may be like our
Father in Heaven (Matt. 5: 44–45). However, it is
also true, as Gantt and Thayne have observed, that
this unconditional valuing of a person has come to be
interpreted as requiring acceptance of false ideas and
harmful attitudes or behaviors. Rogers bears some
responsibility for this interpretation by expecting that
in therapeutic contexts, at least, a client’s attitudes and
behaviors not be given evaluative labels such as good
or bad, right or wrong.
However, this danger might be mitigated somewhat
if proponents of Rogerian ideas learned that Rogers
(1961) did not demand that there be no judgment in
any context but indicated that non-judgment is important primarily in the therapeutic context. Although
he doubted that judgments would help in the growth
of individuals in any context, and even felt that they
might interfere, he wrote, “I believe [judgments] have
a certain social usefulness to institutions and organizations such as schools and professions” (p. 54). That
is, judgment is useful to the well-being of society at
large if not to the individual. I do think separation
of individual and social good might represent an inconsistency in Rogers’s theory. Still, as Charles Taylor
(2007) describes, it is true that religion, along with
other institutions (e.g., educational and professional),
has contributed to the development of the sort of cultural contexts that value and protect personal liberty.
It is in these contexts in particular that Rogers’s corresponding value flourishes. Without some claim to
judgment, such institutions might not exist and with
them might vanish our modern way of life, along with
Rogers’s theory.
So Rogers was astute in recognizing the need
for judgment in certain institutional contexts.
This important distinction might be useful for
religious therapists in helping clients and colleagues
understand why religious leaders are justified in
teaching about righteousness and sin, while therapists
might also be justified in leaving the judgment to

others. Still, religious therapists cannot be limited
only to individualistic and secular expressions in the
therapeutic context. Another possible avenue for
religious expression, even within a therapeutic context,
arises in Rogers’s emphasis on genuineness.
Genuineness

Genuineness, or honesty, might have been for
Rogers an even more important value than unconditional positive regard. He writes (Rogers, 1961):
Being genuine . . . involves the willingness to be and to
express, in my words and my behavior, the various feelings and attitudes which exist in me. It is only in this
way that the relationship can have reality, and reality
seems deeply important as a first condition. (p. 33)

Rogers appeared to suggest here that reality, honesty,
or genuineness is a “first condition” for therapy and so
might be even more fundamental than unconditional
positive regard.
Rogers continues, “It is only by providing the
genuine reality which is in me, that the other person
can successfully seek for the reality in him” (p. 33).
Here Rogers describes a quite powerful (and often
neglected) form of moral persuasion. Rather than
telling the client that he or she must be honest, Rogers
shows the client how to be honest by his own actions.
Similarly, rather than telling the client that he or she
must love, Rogers makes a powerful argument by
his own actions for the moral importance of loving
others. These two values combined, genuineness and
love, seem very like what Gantt and Thayne (p. 19)
describe as “unfeigned love.”
Rogers (1961) requires then, as a first condition of
effective therapy, that the therapist (even, perhaps, if
he or she is religious) be honest and upfront about his
or her own beliefs and feelings:
The most basic learning for anyone who hopes to
establish any kind of helping relationship is that it is
safe to be transparently real. If in a given relationship
I am reasonably congruent, if no feelings relevant to
the relationship are hidden either to me or to the other
person, then I can be almost sure that the relationship
will be a helpful one. (p. 51)

For the LDS therapist, this genuineness might include
lovingly sharing personal testimony of the truthfulness
43
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of the gospel and the wisdom of the commandments
while allowing the client similar expression of his
or her own beliefs. Expressing one’s own beliefs and
feelings, for Rogers (1961), is a more honest form of
expression than trying to point out where the other
person might be wrong:

or she sees as less horrible—in order to test the water.
A young man who got drunk and had sex might start
by admitting that he had tried alcohol. If the bishop
indignantly erupts with, “How could you? You know
better!” he might never hear the extent to which the
youth indulged in alcohol and will almost certainly
hear nothing about the sex.
It might be that only after the bishop empathetically
understands the young man’s fear and shame, as well
as his sin, that the youth might fully admit the sin.
Removing the need for defensiveness might also
allow the young man to explore some of his other,
more positive, and perhaps more powerful, desires
that compete with a desire for sin. For example,
before reminding a person about the seriousness of
his or her sin, a bishop might ask how the person
thinks or feels about his or her action now that
the moment of temptation has passed. After all,
some thought or feeling brought the person to the
bishop’s office to confess. What were the spiritual
and emotional consequences of the behavior from
the person’s perspective? What does the person feel
he or she should have done differently, or what does he
or she hope to do differently in the future? Accurate
empathy requires that the bishop, or therapist, also
seeks for and understands these competing righteous
desires. Otherwise, if the person’s attention is directed
by perceived criticism toward defense or justification
of a hurtful behavior, these righteous impulses might
be forgotten.
It might be important for religious psychologists to
remind their Rogerian colleagues that Rogers did not
only advocate for recognition of the hurtful impulse
but also for recognition of the helpful impulse. This
is too often neglected, I believe, in both religious and
nonreligious helping contexts. With such persistent
emphasis on “disorder” or sin, the therapist and client
both might miss the “order” and goodness within the
client. Missing something so important in the client’s
experience would not represent accurate empathy.
With these two additional Rogerian anchors together (genuineness and accurate empathy), we seem
to have something even closer to what Gantt and
Thayne (p. 19) describe as “unfeigned love”:

It seems that part of the reason this works out constructively is that in therapy the individual learns to
recognize and express his feelings as his own feelings
and not as a fact about another person. Thus, to say to
one’s spouse “What you are doing is all wrong,” is likely
to lead only to debate. But to say “I feel very much annoyed by what you’re doing” is to state one fact about
the speaker’s feelings, a fact which no one can deny.”
(pp. 318–319)

Similarly, a testimony borne about one’s own beliefs
and feelings cannot reasonably be denied. And when
borne without condemnation of the other, it is less
likely that the other will feel a desire to counter it.
In this sense, honest expression of one’s own feelings
without judgment of the other person might indeed
be a more powerful way to lead another person to
change than evaluating or criticizing him or her.
Accurate Empathy

For Rogers, it would be more genuine or honest
to say that one believes the gospel to be true than to
pretend that one has no beliefs that might influence
one’s approach to therapy. However, to insist that the
gospel is obviously true, and that therefore it should
be obvious to a doubting client, might display a lack
of accurate empathy. The truth of the gospel might be
obvious to the therapist, but it might not be obvious to
the client. Rogers (1961) writes:
It is only as I understand the feelings and thoughts
which seem so horrible to you, or so weak, or so sentimental, or so bizarre—it is only as I see them as you see
them, and accept them and you, that you feel really free
to explore all the hidden nooks and frightening crannies of your inner and often buried experience. (p. 34)

I am reminded in this context of some advice I once
heard for bishops. If a young person approaches
the bishop to make a confession, he or she might
nervously start with the elements of the sin that he

The key difference between the genuine, unfeigned
love that God has for us (and which we should have
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Rogers’s Morality

for each other) and the “unconditional positive regard”
that Rogerian humanism venerates as the cure for the
struggle for sexual self-identity is that unfeigned love is
not indifferent to the behavior and desires of those we
love. (p. 37)

Rogers’s nonrelativistic morality was highlighted in
a conversation between Rogers and Gregory Bateson
(Kirschenbaum & Henderson, 1989). Bateson, who
initially took a more relativistic position in his conversation with Rogers, mused that while he himself was
a theorist (working primarily in the realm of theory
rather than application), Rogers actually “believes that
what you do matters”:

I do accept that the rendition of “unconditional
positive regard” described by Gantt and Thayne may
have come to be dangerously venerated in humanistic
psychology, but it seems that this might not be what
Rogers intended. Rather, it seems he intended
something much more like Gantt and Thayne
describe. When we consider his three essential
therapeutic elements together, indifference seems far
from Rogers’s intent.
Similarly, although Russell M. Nelson (2003) and
other Church leaders have cautioned against the
word unconditional when applied to divine love—
likely because of the very baggage Gantt and Thayne
describe—they also invariably acknowledge that
God’s love is infinite and enduring. It is clear that
these leaders understand that there is a difference
between enduring, infinite love (which, if described as
recognizing the worth of a soul in spite of his or her
sins, seems very like Rogers’s unconditional positive
regard) and unconditional positive consequences. Yet,
Rogers acknowledged this difference as well. Although
he wanted unconditional valuing of the person, and
even acceptance of however he or she might use his
or her agency, he also recognized that actions have
consequences that no therapist can mitigate. Accurate
empathy and genuineness require a recognition of
these consequences, positive and negative, as they
are experienced by a client. Contrary to how his
theory might now be viewed, Rogers’s views on this
included elements that were decidedly relational and
nonrelativistic.

[Rogers] starts, you see, in the first two minutes, by
saying there’s good and evil in the world and he knows
which is which, and five years later he will produce data
to prove that he’s right. I’m not so sure about the good
and evil. I believe there is good and evil in the world.
As to which they are, that’s difficult. (p. 182)

Rogers does not contradict this characterization but
in response notes some of Bateson’s criticisms of behaviorism (with which Rogers agreed) and says:
I noticed in your remarks about behavior modification
that you, too, have your values. You may not call them
good and evil, but no one would have to guess very
hard as to the value you’ve placed on that. (Bateson
laughs.) I want you to respond to that, because I feel
that one of the things that I’ve come to value is not
hiding our values. (p. 186)

Bateson responds, “Yes, well I plead guilty” (p. 186)
but protests that he is situating his values not only
in feelings but also in intellectual analysis—to which
Rogers responds:
Then I think that perhaps one real difference between
us is that, if I’ve got it correctly, you justify the feelings that you have about it on the basis of your analysis
of whether it is true or not. Well, I happen to agree
with your analysis. But I think that the feelings exist
whether or not the analysis is true. And I feel it is just
as valuable to be aware of feelings as it is to be aware of
our intellectual processes. And that often even scholars
get screwed up, if I may use a technical term, by not
paying attention to their feelings, but only to the ideas
that they have generated. (p. 187)

Individualism and Relativism

Gantt and Thayne have rightly pointed out that individualism and relativism have been associated with
Rogers’s approach. However, Rogers did not consider
himself a moral relativist, and his theory—although
emphasizing individual value and agency—also acknowledged our inevitably relational nature and even
hinted at the need for self-transcendence.

So it becomes clearer in this conversation that Rogers
does not advocate awareness and acceptance of personal desires for relativistic or hedonistic purposes
but for accessing one’s feelings about what is right,
45
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true, or good. This, without neglecting intellectual
processes.
This calls to my mind God’s emphasis on revealing the truth to our minds and to our hearts (D&C
8:2), which provides two “witnesses,” reducing the
likelihood that either intellect alone or heart alone
might lead us astray (or cause us to “get screwed up,”
in Rogers’s terms). A third witness might be found in
the consequences that follow thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors, both within and beyond ourselves. These
Rogers also acknowledged in nonrelativistic terms:

given agency—learning the good from the evil by their
own experience—people would more likely discover
the truth than by being coercively instructed by a
fallible authority figure. Without inspired leaders, this
is certainly the situation in which many find themselves
in the world, but even in gospel contexts we are
encouraged to seek our own witness of authoritative
teaching—in our minds and hearts and in reflecting on
the consequences of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.
Rogers’s concern about authority is also reminiscent
of Mosiah’s reasons for wanting to turn the
government over to the voice of the people rather than
letting it remain in the hands of one potentially flawed
authority figure. After describing the destruction that
could result by placing their trust in a single powerful
authority (a king), Mosiah explained:

To me, the person who offers the most hope in our crazy
world today, which could be wiping itself out, is the
individual who is most fully aware—most fully aware
of what is going on within himself: physiologically,
feeling-wise, his thoughts; also aware of the external
world that is impinging on him. The more fully he is
aware of the whole system . . . the more hope there is
that he would live a balanced human life without the
violence, the craziness, the deceit, the horrible things
we tend to do to each other in the modern world. (pp.
188–189)

Now it is not common that the voice of the people desireth anything contrary to that which is right; but it is
common for the lesser part of the people to desire that
which is not right; therefore this shall ye observe and
make it your law—to do your business by the voice of
the people. (Mosiah 29:26)

So Rogers acknowledges the very real possibility of evil
but emphasizes his belief that this evil is more likely
to emerge from social influences (e.g. coercive authority figures) than from within the individual. Bateson
then asks how students in Rogers’s educational system
would have their erroneous ideas corrected, if not by
the sort of authoritative pressure applied by teachers.
Rogers responds:

Rogers might have been extreme in his beliefs
about how to actualize the good—primarily through
unfettered self-direction, or a more libertarian form
of democracy than has been typical historically—but
he was certainly not a moral relativist. As Bateson
hinted, Rogers might be more accurately accused
of moral naiveté than of moral relativism. Rollo
May, another rationalist contemporary, hints at this
possibility in a letter to Rogers (Kirschenbaum &
Henderson, 1989):

Well, I think that you have more confidence for yourself
than I have for myself . . . that you know some of the
things that students must and should know. I don’t
have that degree of confidence. I don’t think I do know
what they should know. And I am perfectly sure that
they will pick up erroneous ideas in courses they might
take with me as well as in courses they might have with
others. But if they are directing their own learning, it
will be corrected in the same way that my learning and
yours is corrected. We no longer go to teachers, we get
corrected by our life experiences. (pp. 194–195)

A colleague tells me that when you [Rogers] had the
discussion with Martin Buber in Michigan you said,
“Man is basically good,” and Buber answered, “Man is
basically good—and evil.” I am arguing that we must
include a view of the evil in our world and in ourselves
no matter how much that evil offends our narcissism.
(p. 248)

Rogers provides a two-fold response to this insightful
criticism:

I believe this begins to get at the core of Rogers’s
thinking. He believed in right and wrong, good and
evil, but he did not have confidence in the accepted
authoritative sources of truth (and perhaps with
good reason, from his own experience with sectarian
religion and secular government). He believed that

You [Rollo May] have never seemed to care whether
the evil impulses in man are genetic and inherent or
whether they are acquired after birth. For you they are
just there. For me their origin makes a great deal of difference philosophically. (p. 253)
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So Rogers did not deny that evil impulses exist but
questioned the idea that they are inherent. Rogers
then affirmed that he believed goodness (an actualizing tendency) is inherent but that in his experience he
saw no inherent evil tendency in human beings. He
then explains:

It is clear from verse 39 that the “wicked one” is able
to take away the inherent goodness (light and truth)
of humankind only after they misuse their agency
“through disobedience,” which comes “because of the
tradition of their fathers.”
Rogers hints at the possibility of a self-existent
evil (a “wicked one”), or that voice that entices
us to evil (2 Nephi 2:16), by acknowledging the
existence of “murderous and cruel impulses” that
can be actualized through “social conditioning and
voluntary choice” (Kirschenbaum & Henderson,
1989, p. 254). He describes these impulses as
if they also arise from the person, but in a nonnormative fashion, by comparing them to the
impulse to vomit, which usually comes only when
we have taken something into our system that is
unnatural or unhealthy for it. That Rogers does
not recognize the source of such evil impulses as a
“wicked one” can be understood by his rejection of
traditional religion. This is a serious flaw in Rogers’s
theory, though perhaps an understandable one, and
corresponds to his failure to situate good impulses
in God and our relationship to Him as children.

So how do I account for the evil behavior that is so obviously present in our world? In my experience, every
person has the capacity for evil behavior. I, and others, have had murderous and cruel impulses, desires
to hurt, feelings of anger and rage, desires to impose
our wills on others. It is well to bear in mind that I
also have a capacity to vomit, for example. Whether I,
or anyone, will translate these impulses into behavior
depends, it seems to me, on two elements: social conditioning and voluntary choice. (pp. 253–254)

Rogers’s optimistic view of human nature, tempered
by acknowledgement of social influence and personal
agency, seems remarkably similar to a scriptural
description (D&C 93:30–31, 38–39):
30. All truth is independent in that sphere in which
God has placed it, to act for itself, as all intelligence
also; otherwise there is no existence.
31. Behold, here is the agency of man, and here is the
condemnation of man; because that which was from
the beginning is plainly manifest unto them, and they
receive not the light.

Rogers’s Relationality

So perhaps Rogers’s theory is not relativistic, but is
it still individualistic? After all, it is the individual’s organismic valuing process that leads the individual to
self-actualization. It should be clear now that Rogers
does not deny social realities, but are these, for Rogers,
only a source of evil? Rollo May hints at this danger
of humanistic psychology in the same letter to Rogers
(Kirschenbaum & Henderson, 1989):

38. Every spirit of man was innocent in the beginning;
and God having redeemed man from the fall, men
became again, in their infant state, innocent before
God.
39. And that wicked one cometh and taketh away
light and truth, through disobedience, from the children of men, and because of the tradition of their
fathers.

Thus Yankelovich . . . can say . . .that humanistic psychology is the narcissism of our culture. I believe he is
right. The narcissists are persons who are turned inward rather than outward, who are so lost in self-love
that they cannot see and relate to the reality outside
themselves, including other human beings. (p. 249)

In these verses, it appears that humanity’s basic nature
is indeed good (or innocent), as Rogers supposed
and perhaps contrary to the apparent assumptions
of Buber and May (and much of traditional religion).
The Lord then explains a three-fold source for evil:
traditions of their fathers (vs. 39), misuse of personal
agency (vs. 30–31, 39), and the “wicked one” (vs. 39).
Of these, Rogers names two explicitly (tradition,
or “social conditioning”; and agency, or “voluntary
choice”) and only hints at the possibility of a third.

This assessment clearly troubled Rogers, who responds:
When you speak of the narcissism that has been
fostered by humanistic psychology and how many
individuals are “lost in self-love,” I feel like speaking up
and saying, “That’s not true!” Then I realize that what I
am saying is that it is not true in my experience, but my
47
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experience is limited to clients and groups dealt with
by my particular brand of humanistic psychology and
philosophy. . . . If these characteristics have emerged
in other facets of the humanistic movement, I have
not been in contact with them. I realize this is quite
possible because I am not closely in touch with other
aspects of the humanistic movement.

But being himself doesn’t “solve problems.” It simply
opens up a new way of living in which there is more
depth and more height in the experience of his
feelings; more breadth and more range. He feels more
unique and hence more alone, but he is so much
more real that his relationships with others lose their
artificial quality, become deeper, more satisfying, and
draw more of the realness of the other person into the
relationship. (p. 203)

In the groups with which I have had contact, the truth
is quite the contrary. Such groups lead to social action
of a realistic nature. Individuals who come in as social
fanatics become much more socially realistic, but they
still want to take action. People who have not been very
aware of social issues become more aware, and, again,
opt for realistic action on those issues. (pp. 251–252)

Rogers (1961) finally contrasts his vision of the
behavioral sciences with the prevailing (at the time)
behavioristic view, which emphasized prediction and
control. Here it becomes clear again that—whether
correct or incorrect in his theorizing about human
nature—Rogers did not fundamentally assume or
primarily value individualism, nor did he see the
individual as isolated from the social context. Rather,
he saw individual freedom as inextricable from
the social context and necessary, not only for selfactualization but also for self-transcendence:

So Rogers seemed to acknowledge the possibility
that excessive self-focus—which Gantt and Thayne
suggest followed Rogers’s humanism—might
emerge from other interpretations of humanistic
psychology. However, he suggested that his approach
(rightly understood) should have the opposite effect.
Elsewhere, Rogers (1961) describes more explicitly
how even a therapy that emphasizes self-awareness,
self-expression, and personal agency might lead
to better relational awareness as a client seeks to
genuinely express her or his feelings and a therapist
seeks to genuinely understand them.

We can, if we wish, choose to make men submissive,
conforming, docile. Or at the other end of the spectrum
of choice we can choose to use the behavioral sciences
in ways which will free, not control; which will bring
about constructive variability, not conformity; which
will develop creativity, not contentment; which will
facilitate each person in his self-directed process of
becoming; which will aid individuals, groups, and even
the concept of science, to become self-transcending in
freshly adaptive ways of meeting life and its problems.
The choice is up to us, and the human race being what
it is, we are likely to stumble about, making at times
some nearly disastrous value choices, and at other
times highly constructive ones. (p. 400)

In these moments there is, to borrow Buber’s phrase,
a real “I-Thou” relationship, a timeless living in the
experience which is between the client and me. It is at
the opposite pole from seeing the client, or myself, as
an object. (p. 202)

Part of this genuine understanding of self and
others is recognition of personal agency and the
corresponding influence we might have on others.
Rogers continues:

This sounds almost like an argument that might
have been made in the war in heaven. Agency might
at times result in evil (“disastrous value choices”),
Rogers acknowledged, but it will ultimately enable
a far greater good, including self-transcendence.
Although at this time Rogers could be described as
a materialistic empiricist, perhaps unlike many of his
like-minded contemporaries, he seemed to be tapping
into something that transcended even his own vision
of science. He continues:

Involved in this process of becoming himself is a
profound experience of personal choice. He realizes
that he can choose to continue to hide behind a façade,
or that he can take the risks involved in being himself;
that he is a free agent who has it within his power
to destroy another, or himself, and also the power to
enhance himself and others. (p. 203)

In Rogers’s experience, increased awareness of
personal agency and accountability, although not itself
the solution to a person’s problems, has important
relational implications:

In conclusion then, it is my contention that science
cannot come into being without a personal choice
of the values we wish to achieve. And these values
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of one way of being should be more valuable than
another, why label one choice as more self-actualizing
than another (as Rogers did with choices to be loving,
honest, and understanding)? Further, if we cannot
explain why the individual should value relationship
after experiencing radical personal agency, then why
not simply value individualistic freedom for its own
sake? Or in other words, why not assume that humanistic
psychology will as likely lead to narcissistic self-love
(which Rogers resisted) as to deeper relationships
(which Rogers valued)? These were clearly not outcomes
Rogers intended, but I believe his failure to situate value
and truth in their divine source inevitably led to his
theory being interpreted as radically individualistic and
relativistic. It might also have led to his own late-life selfpermissiveness.
This difficulty has relevance for Gantt and Thayne’s
emphasis on self-denial, or the submission of self to
Christ. This is indeed central in the gospel. There is
a possibility for confusion if we are unsure of what
self we are denying or to what manner of Being we
are submitting. We want to shed, of course, the false
self from Rogers’s viewpoint, or the natural man from
an LDS viewpoint. This is an important distinction.
It might be difficult to extract from Rogers’s theory
which personal desires are consistent with our true
selves (other than those that are loving, honest, and
understanding) or what to do about false desires
when we find them out. The gospel provides better direction. In short, to know our true selves, we
must come to know our divine source, our Heavenly
Parents.
So Gantt and Thayne rightly warn us of the dangers,
but these very dangers might also represent opportunities. Where Rogers is vague, and he seems to be often vague, pathways might open for religious influence
in an otherwise secular discipline. Ammon used the
language of the Lamanites (“the Great Spirit”) to scaffold Lamoni’s understanding of the true God (Alma
18). Similarly, Paul used the language of the Greeks
(“the Unknown God”) to scaffold Greek understanding of the true God (Acts 17). Paul goes on to speak of
becoming “as a Jew,” and “as without law,” and “as weak”
in order to persuade people of different backgrounds
and experiences to believe in Christ (1 Cor. 9). “I am
made all things to all men,” he writes, “that I might by
all means save some” (vs. 22).

we choose to implement will forever lie outside the
science which implements them; the goals we select,
the purposes we wish to follow, must always be outside
of the science which achieves them. To me this has the
encouraging meaning that the human person, with
his capacity of subjective choice, can and will always
exist, separate from and prior to any of his scientific
undertakings. Unless as individuals and groups we
choose to relinquish our capacity of subjective choice,
we will always remain free persons, not simply pawns
of a self-created behavioral science. (pp. 400–401)
A Two-Way Street

The above quotes, I think, highlight both a key
criticism of Rogers’s work and an important potential
inroad for religious views into a secular science. Rogers
hints at realities that his materialistic understanding
of human nature cannot fully explain—such as
a transcendent moral agency and a mysterious
organismic valuing process that tends toward the
good. He asserts the existence of inherent good but
cannot explain why it exists inherently (although he
does a better job articulating the source of evil). He
also seems to underestimate Bateson’s concern about
not being able to tell the difference between good and
evil. He implies that Bateson’s criticism of behavior
modification suggests that Bateson does know the
difference, but Rogers seems to miss the deeper point
that philosophical materialism can provide no reason
why anyone should know the difference. It was in part
this otherwise inexplicable, apparently inescapable,
moral awareness that drew C. S. Lewis (2001) back
to theism.
These materialistic limitations might be the source
of common interpretations of Rogers, which Gantt
and Thayne rightly identify as dangerous from a
gospel perspective. If we do not know why one thing
ought to be valued over another, then why not accept
all values equally (something Rogers clearly did not
do himself )? If we do not know why individuals
have the ability to choose what they value, then why
assume they have any choice at all (as Rogers assumed
they did)? Why not just accept them for what they
are, without assuming that they can, will, or should
grow toward a better way of being (as Rogers assumed
they would)? Or, if we cannot explain why the choice
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It appears—if Gantt and Thayne’s article is
needed—that many psychotherapists and clients still
value a Rogerian approach. For these people, pointing
primarily to incompatibilities might not suffice to get
them to abandon their psychology in favor of religion.
Indeed, it might as soon do the reverse. However, in
explaining why religion better accounts for the very
real goods Rogers observed (such as love, honesty,
and understanding), and provides a surer guide to
actualizing them, we might have a better chance of
reversing the secularizing influence of psychology on
our religion and begin to appropriately infuse our
psychology with the proper spirit.
References
Kirschenbaum, H., & Henderson, V. L. (Eds.). (1989). Carl
Rogers: Dialogues. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Lewis, C. S. (2001). Mere Christianity: A revised and amplified
edition, with a new introduction, of the three books, Broadcast
talks, Christian behaviour, and Beyond personality. San
Francisco, CA: Harper San Francisco.
Nelson, R. M. (2003). Divine love. Ensign. Retrieved from
https://www.lds.org/ensign/2003/02/divine-love
Richardson, M. J. (2013). Baptized in acid or breathed with life?
An exploration of psychology’s bridging capacity. Issues in
Religion and Psychotherapy, 35, 37–46.
Rogers, C. R. (1961). On becoming a person: A therapist’s view of
psychotherapy. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Rogers, C. R. (1980). A way of being. Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin.
Taylor, C. (2007). A secular age. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press.

50

